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The Minimum Wage and 
Youth Unemployment 
Of  all  of  the  factors  involved  in  the 
problem  of  youth  unemployment,  none 
has  been  more extensively debated than 
the  effects  of  the  minimum  wage. 
Governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of  1938  and  periodic  amendments to it, 
the  level of  the  minimum  wage  and  its 
coverage  are  once  again  an  important 
issue.  The 1977  amendments raised  the 
minimum  wage  from  the  previous $2.30 
per  hour  to  $2.65,  effective  January  1, 
1978, and future scheduled increases will 
raise the level to $3.35  by 1981.  Table 1 
presents  a  history  of  the  statutory 
changes in the minimum wage from 1938 
to date. 
The changes in the minimum wage are 
receiving  special  attention  at  this  time 
because of  the high  level  of  unemploy- 
ment  in  the  economy,  especially  for 
minority  teenagers.  In recent  years, 
economists  have  conducted  scores  of 
econometric  studies  to  try  to  ascertain 
the effects  of  changes  in the  minimum 
wage on the labor market.  For the most 
part,  the  studies  have  focused  on 
teenagers, with most of  the emphasis on 
the  unemployment  impact.  Some  other 
studies,  however,  have  examined  the 
effect  on employment,  and  at  least  two 
have looked at the impact of the minimum 
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wage on the distribution of income. 
Given all of  this research, a consensus 
might  reasonably have been expected  to 
emerge that a given percentage change in 
the  minimum  wage  would  result,  on 
average, in a certain percentage change in 
unemployment or  employment.  Unfortu- 
nately, this is not the case.  Although the 
majority of  the sophisticated  models  do 
find significant disemployment effects for 
the minimum wage (that is, a reduction in 
employment in response to an increase in 
the  minimum  wage),  other  valid 
approaches  yield  lnconclusive  results. 
Furthermore,  of  those  studies  yielding 
the theoretically expected negative impact 
of  the  minimum  wage,  the  range  of 
estimated effects  is sufficiently  large as 
to make the estimates of uncertain policy 
value. 
This  article  analyzes  the  reasons  for 
this lack of consensus. The article begins 
with the development  of  two  alternative 
models  of  the  labor  market,  which  are 
used to analyze the theoretical impact of 
the minimum  wage  on employment  and 
unemployment. The  theoretical approach 
is  then  contrasted  with  the  problems 
involved in the empirical estimation of the 
minimum wage impact. Finally, in light of 
these findings, the article concludes with a discussion  of  some  of  the  important 
new  evidence  about  minimum  wage 
issues? 
WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE 
MINIMUM WAGE 
(AND WHY IS IT SO HARD TO PROVE?) 
When  viewed abstractly,  the minimum 
wage  might  appear  to  be  a  reasonably 
good  tool  for  protecting  poor  workers 
from unconscionably low wages,  helping 
to  relieve  poverty,  and  maintaining 
purchasing  power  in  the  economy? 
Economic analysis reveals, however,  that 
because  of  a  number  of  unintended 
effects  of  the  minimum  wage,  these 
benefits do not necessarily result. 
The Theoretical Model 
The theoretical impact of  the minimum 
wage is fairly simple and straightforward. 
If there were no imperfections in the labor 
market, if wages could move both up and 
down,  and  if  all  adjustments  were 
instantaneous,  the  situation  would  be 
approximated by  the  supply  curve,  SS, 
and the demand curve,  DD,  as  shown in 
Figure  1.  The  supply  curve  shows  the 
number of  workers who would be willing 
to work  at  any  given wage,  the demand 
curve  shows the number  who  would  be 
demanded by employers at any wage, and 
their  intersection  represents  an  equilib- 
1 The best  evaluation of minimum wage research 
through 1974  is Robert  S.  Goldfarb,  "The  Policy 
Content of Quantitative Mlnlmum Wage Research," 
Proceedings  of.  the  27th  Annual  Meeting  of  the 
industrial  Relations  Research  Association,  1974, 
pp. 261-68. See also Minlmum Wage and Maximum 
Houra Standards  Under  the Fair Labor  Standards 
Act,  Employment  Standards  Administration,  U.S. 
Department of Labor, October 1977, pp.  41-54; and 
The Problem of  Teenage  Unemployment,  Alan  A. 
Fisher,  unpublished Ph.D.  dissertation, University 
of California, Berkeley,  August 1973, Chapter 3. 
2 See  Clara  F.  Schloss,  "Closing  the  Minimum 
Wage  Gap,"  AFL-CIO  Amerlcan  Federntlonist, 
January 1976. 
Table 1 
MINIMUM WAGE RATE CHANGES 
Nonfarm Workers 
Newly  Farm 
Covered  Workers*  Covered 
October 24,  1938  $0.25  $ -  $ - 
October 24, 1939  0.30  -  - 
October 24, 1945  0.40  -  - 
January 25,  1950  0.75  -  - 
March 1,  1956  1  .OO  -  - 
September 3,  1961  1.1 5  1  .OO  - 
September 3,  1963  1.25  -  - 
September 3. 1964  -  1.15  - 
September 3. 1965  -  1.257  - 
February 1,  1967  1.40 t  1  .OO  1  .OO 
February 1, 1968  1.60  1.15  1.15 
February 1, 1969  -  1.30  1.30 
February 1,  1970  -  1.45  - 
February 1,  1971  -  1.60  - 
May  1,  1974  2.00  1.90  1.60 
January 1,  1975  2.10  2.00  1.80 
January  1,  1976  2.30  2.20  2.00 
January  1. 1977  -  2.30  2.20 
January 1,  1978  2.65  2.65  2.65 
January  1, 1979  2.90  2.90  2.90 
January 1, 1980  3.10  3.10  3.10 
January 1, 1981  3.35  3.35  3.35 
'Not  all farm workers are covered by the minimum 
wage. 
tAil  job  categories  covered  prior  to  the  1966 
amendments  were  raised  to  $1.40  per  hour  in 
February 1967. 
SOURCE:  1938-1971 : Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics, 
Youth  Unemployment  and  Mlnlmum  Wages, 
Bulletin 1657, Washington, D.C.,  GPO, 1970, p. 11, 
Table 1.5,  1974-1977:  U.S.  Department  of  Labor, 
Employment  Standards  Administration,  Minlmum 
Wage  and  Maximum  Houra  Standards  Under  the 
Fair  Labor  Standards  Act,  an  Economic  Effects 
Study submitted to Congress 1977, p. 3. 
rium  where  the  number  of  workers 
actually  hired,  given  by  distance  ONo, 
would receive the market wage,  OWo. 
Suppose  now  that  a  minimum  wage, 
OWm,  which  is  greater  than  the 
equilibrium  wage,  OWo,  is imposed  on 
the  labor  market.  Since  at  the  higher 
minimum  wage,  the  number  of  workers 
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who  wish  to  work,  OD,  exceeds  the 
number of  workers that will be demanded 
by business, OA,  some workers,  AD,  will 
be  without  jobs.  If  all  of  these 
unemployed  workers  stay  in  the  labor 
market,  the unemployment  rate-the 
number  of  unemployed  workers  divided 
by  the number  in the  labor  market-will 
be ADIOD, an involuntary unemployment 
caused by the imposition of the minimum 
wage. 
A  somewhat  more  realistic  picture  is 
presented  in Figures  2a  and  2b  by 
relaxing  some  of  the  previous  assump- 
tions.  Here  assume  that  the  economy 
consists of two sectors: a covered sector, 
in  which  workers  receive  the  minimum 
wage  (Figure  2a);  and  an  uncovered 
sector, in which wages are set  by supply 
and  demand  (Figure  2b).  Assume  also 
that people have the option of working (or 
seeking work) in either sector, that those 
not working may be either unemployed or 
out  of  the  labor  force,  and  that 
adjustments to outside influences (as the 
imposition  or  increase  of  a  minimum 
wage) take time? 
Initially, in the absence of a minimum 
wage,  there  is  no  unemployment  (both 
markets clear), and those employed in the 
covered market, ONo, receive the covered 
market  wage,  OWo.  When  a  minimum 
wage  is  imposed in the covered  sector, 
demand  first  reacts  along  D  short  run. 
Some  firms  cut  back  on  their  labor 
'immediately,  but  others  adjust  only 
slowly.  However,  because  the  demand 
curve  has  a  negative  slope,  fewer 
workers,  only  OB,  are  hired  at  the 
minimum  wage,  leaving a  number,  BD, 
involuntarily unemployed, and raising the 
unemployment rate, from zero to BDIOD. 
Over  time,  the  adjustment  proceeds 
further. Some unskilled labor is replaced 
by  higher  skilled  labor and  capital,  and 
the relevant demand curve is D long run. 
3 Figure 2a is taken from Fisher, p. 53. Figure 2 
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If  supply  were  not  affected,  unemploy- 
ment  would rise,  to AD,  the  unemploy- 
ment rate  would also climb,  to ADIOD, 
and  employment  would  fall  further,  to 
OA. 
However, supply effects are also likely, 
and these can work in two directions. The 
higher posted wage in the covered sector 
could  lure  some  workers  from  the 
uncovered to the covered sector. On the 
other  hand,  because  the  probability  of 
finding  employment  has  fallen,  workers 
will tend to leave the covered sector and 
either drop out of the labor force or enter 
the uncovered sector. The most likely net 
effect  is a  fall  in supply,  shown  by  a 
leftward shift in the supply  curve to S*, 
yielding a lower  level  of  unemployment, 
AC,  and  a  lower  unemployment  rate, 
ACIOC,  than  before  the  supply  shift. 
Covered employment,  OA,  is not  further 
changed by the supply shift, and remains 
below the equilibrium level. However, the 
Figure 2b UNCOVERED  SECTOR 
Wages 
imposition  of  the  minimum  wage 
adversely affects an additional number of 
workers, CD,  by  forcing them out of  the 
higher wage covered sector. 
.  The  uncovered  sector  is also  affected 
by the minimum wage,  though indirectly. 
Generally viewed as  consisting of  small, 
low-wage  firms,  the  uncovered  sector 
may be pictured as in Figure 2b,  with an 
equilibrium  wage,  OWu,  lower  than  the 
covered equilibrium wage, OWo. If the net 
effect of  the minimum wage is a shift of 
workers  into  the  uncovered  sector,  this 
results  in an  increase  in  the  supply  of 
workers  or  a  rightward  shift  in  the 
uncovered supply curve to S*u. Since the 
new uncovered equilibrium is given by the 
intersection of the demand curve with the 
new  supply  curve,  total  uncovered 
employment increases, but the new  wage 
rate is lower for all uncovered workers. In 
general,  the final effect of  the  minimum 
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0  Nu  Nlu  Number of  Workers lower  covered  employment,  greater 
covered unemployment, higher uncovered 
employment  (though  not  enough  to 
absorb all the covered loss), and a lower 
uncovered wage rate? 
Problems of  Estimation 
Given  this  scenario,  why  is  it  so 
difficult to estimate the actual effects of 
the  minimum  wage?  Primarily,  the 
difficulty arises because the labor market 
is far more complex than can be exactly 
modeled by a pair of diagrams or even the 
most  sophisticated set  of  equations.  In 
particular,  an  analysis  of  the  type  in 
diagrams  2a  and  2b  implicitly  assumes 
that  the  labor  market  can  be  readily 
divided into a single covered and a single 
uncovered sector, each of which contains 
a homogeneous type of labor receiving its 
respective wage rate.  The  real  world,  of 
course,  is much  more  complicated, 
consisting  of  many  different  types  of 
labor and many  different  equilibrium 
wage  rates.  Nevertheless,  in  order  to 
estimate the impact of  the imposition or 
increase  in  the  minimum  wage,  a 
researcher must separate and model that 
part of the labor market in which workers 
are  essentially  homogeneous and  in 
which the  statutory  minimum  wage,  Wc 
in  Figure  2a,  exceeds  Wo,  the  market 
clearing  wage,  thereby  setting  an 
effective  floor  on  wages  once  it  is 
imposed.  Rather  than  being  an 
identifiable  part  of  the  economy, 
Using a general equilibrium  analysis,  James  F. 
Ragan,, Jr.,  points  out  that,  theoietlcaiiy,  the 
change in relative wage costs  in  the  two  sectors 
can result  in a  shift  In  product  and derived  labor 
demand  so  as  to result  in  a net  increase In  total 
employment.  Among  other  things,  thls  result 
assumes  that  most  of  the  discouraged  covered 
workers would be willing to shift to  the uncovered 
sector. See Ragan, "The Theoretical Ambiguity of a 
M  lnlmum Wage," Atlantlc Economic Journal, 
March 1977. 
however,  such a sector consists  of  parts 
of some industries and occupations, and 
includes some teenagers (but not all) and 
some adults as  well.  In fact, although a 
greater percentage of  teenagers  than 
adults are low-wage recipients, adults are 
a  much  larger  group,  and  by  far  the 
greatest  number  of  those  receiving  low 
wages are  adult^.^ 
The difficulty in identifying  the appro- 
priate covered  sector highlights  the fact 
that,  in an  economically  meaningful 
sense,  there is probably no such thing as 
a homogeneous "teenage  labor  market." 
From a theoretical standpoint, it would be 
preferable to consider the covered sector 
as consisting of a low productivity labor 
market in which the minimum  wage sets 
an  effective  wage  floor  (and  where, 
incidentally,  teenagers are  concentrated) 
and a high productivity,  high-wage labor 
market? 
All  studies  which,  nevertheless, 
attempt  to  estimate  the  impact  of  a 
minimum  wage  change on "the  teenage 
labor market,"  implicitly assume that  an 
economically  meaningful  "teenage  labor 
market" actually  exists.  The  market  so 
estimated,  however,  is both  too  narrow 
and  too  broad:  too  narrow  in  that  the 
more  theoretically  appropriate  low-pro- 
ductivity  labor  market  includes  many 
nonteenagers who  also compete for  the 
low-wage  jobs,  and  too  broad  because 
many  of  the  teenagers  included, 
especially those 18-19  years  of  age,  are 
actually  able  to  find  high-wage 
5 See  Edward  M.  Gramilch,  "The  Impact  of  the 
Minimum Wage on Other Wages, Employment, and 
Famlly Incomes," Brooking8  Papers on  Economlc 
Activity, 1878:  2,  Tables 2 and  3,  and  Fisher,  pp. 
116-1  8 and Tables 2.7-2.9. 
6 My thanks to James F. Ragan, Jr., for his helpful 
comments  on  thls  point.  The  low  productivity 
sector would correspond to diagram 2a. The  high 
productlvlty sector has  no  counterpart in  the  two 
diagrams. employment  and  thus  are  not  directly 
affected by the minimum wage? 
However, though theoretically superior, 
the  concept  of  a  low-productivity  labor 
market is almost impossible to work with. 
Given available data,  there  is simply  no 
way to identify those persons who should 
be  included  in the  low-wage population 
over which the model is to be estimated. 
On  empirical  grounds,  then,  the 
researcher is largely forced to work  with 
some measure of a teenage labor market. 
In  so  doing,  however,  he  commits 
potentially  serious  econometric  errors. 
These errors arise because the data used 
in the estimation  procedure  are  not 
strictly  appropriate  to  explain  the 
minimum  wage  impact  on  the  employ- 
ment  of  teenagers.  For  example,  if  a 
teenage wage variable were available and 
used as one of  the explanatory variables, 
it would be misspecified because it would 
be an average of  wages received by  both 
high-  and  low-wage  teenagers.  Further- 
more,  since  teenage  employment  de- 
pends upon the wage  rate in both  high- 
and low-wage sectors, including only one 
wage  variable means  that  a variable has 
been  omitted  from  the  model.  Both  of 
these specification errors tend to bias the 
estimated  results.  A  similar problem 
arises from not considering the impact on 
teenage  employment  of  the  wage 
distribution of  low-wage  adults  who 
compete  with  low-wage  teenagers  for 
low-productivity jobs8 
In general,  however,  researchers  have 
been  forced  to  ignore  these  problems. 
Instead,  the  format  that  most  models 
finally  take is to try  to explain,  through 
regression analysis, some  variant  of 
teenage  employment  or  unemployment 
(the dependent variable) by  several  labor 
market  factors  such  as  the  minimum 
7 Fisher, p. 115. 
8 Fisher, pp. 115-16. 
wage,  a  measure  of  economic  activity, 
and  some  other  independent  variables. 
Using  time  series  data,  the  model  is 
generally of the form: 
Zt  = f(AD, MW, XI,  . . ., Xn) 
Zt  is  either  the  teenage 
unemployment rate or the ratio 
of  teenage  unemployment  or 
employment  to  the  teenage 
population  for  a  specific 
age-sex-color group. 
AD is a measure of aggregate 
demand,  like the  gap  between 
real  and  potential  GNP,  or  a 
measure  of  labor  market 
tightness,  like  the  adult  male 
unemployment rate. 
MW  is  a  measure  of  the 
minimum wage. 
XI,  . . .,  Xn  are  other 
independent variables such as a 
time trend, a coverage  variable 
for  the minimum  wage,  or  the 
supply of teenagers. 
f  indicates  the  functional 
form,  generally  linear  or 
log-linear. 
The  fundamental difficulty involved in 
specifying  this  model  for  estimation, 
however, is that the available data are of 
extremely poor quality.  Economic theory 
has  far surpassed the state  of  the  data. 
As  a  result,  extremely  sophisticated 
models,  including  all of  the "right" 
variables can be elaborated but cannot be 
estimated  as  originally  presented. 
Instead,  serious  compromises  must  be 
made in which some desired variables are 
omitted,  proxies  are  used  for  other 
variables for which data do not exist,  or 
8  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Economic Review  January 1978 data  series  are  generated  through 
extremely  complicated,  but  often  ques- 
tionable, processes. 
The Case of the Minimum Wage Variable 
The most striking example of  this data 
problem concerns the choice of MW,  the 
minimum wage variable. If an estimate is 
to be made, using time series data, of the 
effect  of  the minimum  wage  on  teenage 
employment,  the  minimum  wage  data 
series  must  first  have  the  influence  of 
inflation removed from it. Clearly, a $2.30 
minimum wage would affect employment 
very differently in 1938 than in 1977.  The 
correct  deflation  factor,  however,  is 
probably not a series  like the consumer 
price  index.  Instead,  according  to  the 
earlier theoretical discussion,  the proper 
choice  is  the  market  clearing  wage  for 
teenagers (Wo in Figure 2a).  The reason 
is that,  given the covered  labor market's 
supply  and  demand curves,  the level  of 
unemployment induced by  the  minimum 
wage  is  determined  by  the  relationship 
between  the  minimum  wage  and  the 
market  clearing  wage  that  would  have 
existed in its absence.  Unfortunately,  the 
market clearing wage series for teenagers 
is  unknown.  Other  price  series  may  be 
used as  the deflator  in its place  only  if 
their movements over time tend to parallel 
those of  the market wage. 
The  method  most  researchers  use  to 
deflate their minimum  wage  variables is 
to divide  the  statutory  minimum  wage, 
MW*,  by  the average hourly  earnings of 
nonsupervisory  employees  in  either 
manufacturing  or  the  private  nonfarm 
economy  (AHE),  thus  yielding  the 
variable  MW  in  the  model  described 
earlier.  The  principal  attractiveness  of 
AHE  is that  it is a reasonably accurate, 
readily available time series  estimate  of 
wages.  But  it  is  not  likely  that  AHE 
moves,  over  time,  like  the  hypothetical 
and  unknown  market-clearing  wage  for 
teenagers. Nor is it likely that AHE is an 
equally  good  approximation  for  the 
various market  wages  that  exist  in  the 
many  industries or occupations  that 
employ  teenagers.  Because  its denomi- 
nator has no necessary relationship to the 
teenage  labor  market,  the  inflation- 
adjusted minimum wage variable will tend 
to have attributed to it a biased estimate 
of  its  influence  on  the  employment  of 
teenagers. 
The  minimum  wage  variable  used  by 
many studies has a further complication. 
Since  the  minimum  wage  was  first 
introduced in 1938, two types of changes 
have  been  taking  place:  hourly  wages 
have  been  rising,  and  the  size  of  the 
uncovered sector has been falling as new 
industries  are  covered,  and  industries 
previously  covered  in  part  experience 
expanded  coverage.  Furthermore,  when 
workers  become  newly  covered,  they 
generally  enter  coverage  at  a  lower 
minimum  wage,  and  through  larger  or 
more  frequent  increases,  gradually 
achieve the regular schedule (Table 1). 
Because  changes  in  coverage  clearly 
affect the impact  of  the minimum wage, 
these  changes  must  be  taken  into 
account in the model.  The  way  this has 
generally been  done is to define  a new, 
weighted minimum  wage variable,  which 
may be called MWAGE.Q 
If there were only one industry and all 
of  the jobs in it had been covered by the 
minimum  wage  for  many  years,  the 
variable MWAGE would correspond to the 
variable MW  discussed earlier.  However, 
this  is  not  the  case.  The  variable 
MWAGE,  instead,  incorporates  the  fact 
that the total effect of the minimum wage 
on  employment is the  weighted  sum  of 
the  different  effects  on  employment  by 
industry. The weights used recognize that 
not only do some  industries have partial 
coverage, but that industries also vary as 
to  the  percentage  of  workers  in  job categories  that  have  been  covered  for 
many  years  and  the  percentage  newly 
covered by recent amendments. Because 
the  MWAGE  variable  incorporates  this 
weighting  scheme  as  well  as  the 
adjustment  for inflation, it is referred to 
as the "effective minimum wage." Though 
representing a major conceptual improve- 
ment  over  earlier  methodologies  that 
excluded  a  coverage  variable,  this 
composite variable  also  has  serious 
problems  that  greatly  complicate  the 
interpretation  and  accuracy  of  the 
estimated equation. 
9 
AHEi  AHEi 
where  i = major industry division. 
t  = total nonfarm economy. 
E = payroll employment. 
AHE  = average  hourly  earnings  of  non- 
supervisory employees. 
MB  = baslc mlnlmum wage  for  long-time 
covered workers. 
MN = minimum  for  newly  covered  work- 
ers. 
CB  = proportion  of  nonsupervisory  em- 
ployees covered by  the baslc mini- 
mum for long-time covered workers. 
CN  = proportion  of  nonsupervlsory  work- 
ers  covered  by  the  most  recent 
minimum wage amendment. 
This method was developed by the U.S.  Bureau 
of  Labor  Statistics,  Youth  Unemployment  and 
Mlnlmum Wages, Bulletin 1657, Washington, D.C., 
Government  Printlng  Office,  1970,  p.  12. 
Essentially, what thls variable does is to define an 
effective  minimum  wage  as  a  double  weighted 
average (MWAGE). Within each  Industry, denoted 
by i, the  respective  minimum  wage  rates  of  the 
long-time covered (MB) and  newly  covered  (MN) 
workers are deflated by the level of average hourly 
earnings (AHE), and weighted by the proportion of 
nonsupervisory  workers either  long-time  (CB)  or 
newly  covered  (CN)  in  that  industry.  These  two 
products are summed, and weighted in turn by the 
proportion of  all payroll  employment  represented 
by that industry (ElIEt). 
The difficulties engendered by the 
combined  minimum  wagelcoverage vari- 
able (MWAGE) are basically of two kinds. 
First,  the  combined  variable  implicitly 
assumes that a given percentage change 
in coverage has  exactly the same effect 
on  the  dependent  variable  as  does  the 
same  percentage  change  in  the  wage 
level.  There  is,  however,  no  theoretical 
basis for believing this to be  the case?' 
The  second  type  of  problem  with  this 
combined variable involves the weighting 
procedure used to apportion coverage and 
minimum  wage  changes  among  indus- 
tries.  Like  the  problems  involved  in  the 
proper  choice  of  a  deflated  wage 
variable-problems that  still  remain 
here-similar  complications  also  arise 
from  the  use  of  coverage  weights  in 
MWAGE which are totally unrelated to the 
hypothetical  teenage  labor  market.  The 
important point is that, in order to explain 
changes  in  the  dependent  variable-for 
example,  teenage  employment-move- 
ments  in independent  variables  like 
MWAGE must  lead  to (theoretically, 
should  cause)  movements  in  the 
dependent  variable.  If  changes  in 
minimum  wage  coverage  are  to  affect 
teenage  employment,  therefore,  the 
coverage  changes  included  in  the 
MWAGE variable must either be changes 
in the coverage of  teenagers or, if this is 
10 Furthermore, in a model developed to estimate 
the  responsiveness of  employment  to  minimum 
wage changes (the wage elasticity of employment), 
Gramlich has shown that the coverage variable and 
the  basic  minimum  wage  term  should  enter  the 
equation with different coefficients and in different 
mathematical  forms.  Ignoring  thls  fact,  he 
concludes,  probably  biases  downward  the  total 
estimated  elasticity  for  the  minimum  wage  and 
coverage changes. Gramlich, pp. 415  and 433.  On 
the  other  hand,  Michael  C.  Lovell,  In "The 
Minimum Wage Reconsldered," Western Economlc 
Journal, December 1973, reports that his particular 
model was not especially sensitive to his minimum 
wage variable's specification. 
10  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Econon  nic Review  January 1978 unknown, proxies for these changes. But 
the distribution of  teenagers  among 
industries,  and  the .occupational  distri- 
bution  of  teenagers  within  industries, 
differs  greatly  from  that  for  *all 
"nonsupervisory  employees,"  the  group 
to which  the coverage  weights  (CB  and 
CN  in  footnote  9)  in  MWAGE  actually 
apply.  Because  of  this,  the  coverage 
weights used to apportion  the  minimum 
wage effect would all surely be different if 
they  could  be  defined  for  the  teenage 
labor  force.  Incorrect  specification  of 
both  the  weights  and  hourly  earnings 
series in the MWAGE variable casts doubt 
on  the  conclusion  that  the  estimated 
coefficients are capturing  the true effect 
of the minimum wage on the youth labor 
market. 
Other Problems of Estimation 
The minimum wage variable is not  the 
only variable that  suffers from poor data 
or  problems  in  specification.  The 
dependent  variable,  for  example,  has  at 
least  two  such  difficulties.  First,  as 
hinted at earlier, using the employment of 
"all  teenagers" as  a  dependent  variable 
biases  the estimated  disemployment 
effect  of  the  minimum  wage  downward 
because the group is too inclusive.  Many 
teenagers  earn  higher  than  minimum 
wages and thus are essentially unaffected 
by  changes  in  the  minimum.  Further- 
more,  raising  the  minimum  might  result 
in employers  hiring some  previously 
part-time, unemployed, or nonpartici- 
pating  high-productivity  workers  as  a 
substitute  for  the  now  over-priced, 
low-productivity  workers.  In both cases, 
the  inclusion  of  high-wage teenagers  in 
the  labor  market  being  modeled  would 
result in an underestimate of  the decline 
in  employment  due  to a  change  in  the 
minimum  wage!'  Second,  labor  market 
11 Gramlich, p. 432. 
data  by  race,  especially  unemployment 
statistics  for minorities,  are  of  very 
uneven  quality.  For  this  reason,  the 
minimum  wage  effect  estimated  for 
minority  groups tends  to be  much  less 
reliable  than  that  for  whites  or  for  the 
population as a whole. 
Further. difficulties  also  arise  in  the 
proper  choice  of  the  other  independent 
variables,  which  are  included  in  the 
equation  to  account  for  external 
conditions that might affect the estimated 
influence  of  the  minimum  wage.  For 
example,  if  some  variable  serving  as  a 
proxy for labor market tightness were not 
included, movements in teenage employ- 
ment  due  to  changing, economic 
conditions might be mistakenly attributed 
to minimum wage  change^.'^ On the other 
hand,  data  simply  don't  exist  in  usable 
form for variables such as family income 
and educational attainment, which almost 
certainly affect the supply  of  labor,  and 
for variables like changing labor  quality, 
which  would  be  expected  to  affect 
demand. Instead, variables like these tend 
to be omitted from the equations that are 
estimated and their effects are incorrectly 
attributed to other variables in the model. 
One  specific  controversy  in  the 
literature highlights the problems of 
appropriate variable choice. One group of 
studies finds evidence  of  significant 
unemployment  effects  of  the  minimum 
wage,  while a second  group  finds  little 
such  evidence.  While  many  differences 
exist in the two sets of  studies,  Michael 
C. Lovell has shown that the fundamental 
12 Note,  however,  that. a  variable  such  as  the 
often-used unemployment rate of adult males may 
be  a  very  imperfect  control  for  labor  market 
tightness as  it. pertains  to  teenage  employment. 
The  teenage  industrial  and  occupational 
distributions are very  different  from  that  for  adult 
workers.  Because  of  this,  shifts  in  demand  for 
teenage  workers  may  not  correspond  to  overall 
demand shifts in the economy. cause  of  the  conflicting  conclusions  is 
that  those  studies  which  find  no 
significant unemployment  effect  include 
as. one of  their  independent  variables a 
variable  to capture  the  rapid  population 
growth  of  teenagers.  Only  when  this 
growth variable is omitted is a significant 
unemployment  effect  found  for  the 
minimum  wage.  The  argument  for 
including the population variable is that it 
reflects the rapid increase in the supply of 
teenage  workers  which  has  tended  to 
increase teenage  unemployment.  The 
arguments against including this variable 
are  first,  that  the  increasing  supply  of 
teenagers affects their unemployment 
only  because the  minimum  wage  keeps 
market  wages  from  falling  and  thereby 
clearing  the  market,  and  second,  that 
serious  econometric  problems  arise  if 
both population and  minimum  wage 
variables are  included in the model.  The 
question  then is,  should such  a growth 
variable be included? As the case for both 
sides  is strong,  this  important  issue  is 
still unre~olved?~ 
SOME IMPORTANT NEW EVIDENCE 
Largely because of shortcomings in the 
data, the final word on the impact of  the 
minimum  wage  is  clearly  not  yet  in. 
Nevertheless,  the quality  of  the  studies 
examining  this  question  has  been 
improving  as  more  refined  estimation 
techniques  are  applied  and  new  data 
13 Articles  by  Fisher,  and  Douglas  K.  Adie  and 
Lowell Galiaway conclude  no:  articles  by  Hyman 
Kaitz  and  Lovell  say  yes.  For  a  summary  of  the 
controversy,  see  Goldfarb.  See  also  Fisher,  "The 
Minimum  Wage  and  Teenage  Unemployment:  A 
Comment on  the  Literature;"  Adie  and  Gallaway, 
"The Minlmum Wage and Teenage Unemployment: 
A  Comment;"  and  Lovell,  "The  Minlmum  Wage 
Reconsldered,"  all  In  The  Western  Economic 
Journal,  December  1973.  Also  see  Kaltz, 
"Experience of the Past: The National  Minimum" in 
Youth  Unemployment  and  Mlnlmum  Wages, 
Bulletin 1657, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1970, pp. 
30-54. 
sources  are  utilized.  Two  such  recent 
studies  by  Ragan  and  Gramlich  provide 
added insight into this important  issue14 
Ragan's Analysis 
Using a two equation model, James F. 
Ragan,  Jr.,  examines  the  effect  of 
minimum  wages  on  the  youth  labor 
market.  His two dependent variables are 
the  fraction  of  the  teenage  population 
employed and the fraction of the teenage 
population  in  the  labor  force.  Using 
results  from these two equations,  he  is 
able to construct estimates of unemploy- 
ment  rate  elasticities,  that  is,  the 
percentage  response  of  unemployment 
rates to given percentage changes in the 
minimum  wage.  The  minimum  wage 
variable  he  uses  is  similar  to  the 
combined  minimum  wage /coverage vari- 
able discussed earlier (MWAGE),  but has 
the  additional  refinement  of  weighting 
each  industry  by  its  share  of  youth 
employment rather than its share of total 
employment. In addition,  through use of 
previously unexploited data, he is able to 
estimate  separate  equations  for  16 
population groups delineated by  student 
and  nonstudent  status,  age  (16-17  and 
18-1  9 years old), sex, and race. 
Partly because of better data,  Ragan's 
findings are more conclusive for men than 
for women and for whites than for blacks. 
His  results,  nevertheless,  are  broadly 
consistent,  and  point  to  a  major 
disemployment  effect  for  the  minimum 
wage. For example, Ragan calculates the 
employment  loss  in 1972  from  the 1966 
minimum  wage  amendment  which 
increased coverage  a'nd  raised  both  the 
long-time covered minimum from $1.25  to 
$1.60,  and  the  newly  covered  rate  from 
$1  .OO  to  $1.60.  Ragan's  model  reveals 
that,  had  the  amendment  not  been 
14 Ragan, "Minimum Wages and the  Youth  Labor 
Market," The Review  of  Economics and Statistics, 
May 1977; and Gramlich. 
12  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Econom  .ic Review  January 1978 enacted, total youth employment in 1972 
would have been higher by 225,000,  or 3.3 
per cent;  nonwhite employment 13.8  per 
cent  higher,  and  white  employment  2.4 
per cent higher. Similarly, because of  the 
amendment,  the  teenage  unemployment 
rate rose 3.8  percentage points by 1972. 
This consisted of an increase for males of 
4.5  percentage  points;  for  females,  2.9 
points;  for  whites,  3.9  points;  and  for 
nonwhites, 3.0 points above the level that 
would  have  existed  had  the  amendment 
not been enacted.15 
Ragan's  research  also  contributes  to 
the debate over whether it is appropriate 
to  include  an  independent  variable 
which  captures  the  effect  of  teenage 
population  growth  on  employment.  On 
the hypothesis that the relative supply of 
teenagers  affects  their  employment  and 
participation,  Ragan  includes  a  teenage 
labor  supply  variable  in  both  his 
equations in the  form  of  the  ratio  of  a 
teenage  group's  population  to the  total 
population  16  years  of  age  and  older. 
Unlike  earlier  studies,  which  used  the 
unemployment  rate  as  the  dependent 
variable,  Ragan's model  with the relative 
supply  variable  shows  the  significant 
minimum  wage  disemployment  effects 
reported  above.  Further  disaggregating 
his sample, however, Ragan shows that it 
is  only  for  nonwhite  youth  that  their 
increased relative population has resulted 
in  serious  disemployment;  white  teen- 
agers show no such effect. 
Gramlich: The Impact of Minimum 
Wages on Employment and Income 
The  study  by  Edward  M.  Gramlich  is 
perhaps the  most  comprehensive  in  the 
.. . 
15 Ragan explains the greater unemployment effect 
for  whites  than  for  nonwhites by  another  finding 
which shows that the higher minimum wage tends 
to  slightly  encourage  white  labor  force 
participation,  while  it  slightly  discourages 
participation among nonwhites. 
minimum  wage  literature-treating  not 
only  the  disemployment  question  (how 
much employment falls in response to an 
increase in the minimum wage), but also 
issues such as compliance, coverage, the 
reaction of  other wages to the changing 
minimum, and the inflationary impact of 
the  minimum  wage.  Gramlich's  central 
point is that  whatever else the minimum 
wage is intended to do,  it is basically an 
attempt to alter the distribution of income 
in  favor  of  low-income  families.  The 
question  is  whether  it  effectively 
accomplishes  that  goal.  Gramlich's 
approach is both innovative and extremely 
complex.  Working  from  two  theoretical 
models  of  the  labor  market,  he  derives 
criteria for assessing the conditions 
under  which  low-wage  workers,  as  a 
group,  would  be  made  better  off  by 
increases  in  either  the  minimum  wage 
level or its coverage. 
Gramlich estimates  separately  the 
actual  disemployment  effect  of  the 
minimum  wage  for  low-wage groups  of 
teenagers, adult men,  and adult  women. 
He  then  calculates  whether  this 
disemployment  is sufficiently  large  that 
each group of low-wage workers, taken as 
a whole,  would perceive itself  as  worse 
off  after  the  minimum  wage  change 
according to the criteria derived from his 
theoretical  models.  Using  this  method, 
Gramlich  obtains  somewhat  ambiguous 
results.  First of all,  he finds disemploy- 
ment effects for teenagers and adult men, 
but none for adult women. Nevertheless, 
he concludes that none of the groups are 
made  worse  off  by  a  higher  minimum 
wage because the disemployment effects 
do  not  outweigh  the  greater  income 
received  by  those  continuing  to  be 
employed at the higher minimum?' 
. . 
16 Gramlich estimates that a10 per cent  increase 
in the minimum  wage  would  yield a 0.9  per cent 
fall in the employment of teenagers. His estimates Gramlich,  however,  goes  on  to  show 
that the conclusion of  no overall harm is 
quite deceiving for the teenage group. It 
turns  out  that,  when  each  population 
group is considered in terms of the effect 
of  the  minimum  wage  on  full-time  and 
part-time employment, a striking result is 
obtained. As Gramlich observes: 
"What is happening . . . is that 
high  minimum  wages  reduce 
full-time  employment  of  teen- 
agers  substantially,  forcing 
many  of  them  into  part-time 
employment.  The  net  result  is 
the  relatively  slight  overall 
disemployment  effect  typically 
found in other studies. If this is 
why  disemployment  is  so 
slight,  the most  reasonable 
verdict  is  that  teenagers  have 
more to lose than to gain from 
higher  minimum  wages:  they 
appear to be  forced out  of  the 
better jobs,  denied  full-time 
work,  and  paid  lower  hourly 
wage  rates;  and  all  of  these 
developments  are  probably 
detrimental  to  their  income 
prospects in both the short and 
the long run."17 
A similar analysis  for  adult  men  also 
shows a noticeable increase in part-time 
are  generally  lower  than  those  obtained  In other 
studies  of  teenagers,  which  calculate  approxi- 
mately  a  2  per  cent  fall  in  teenage  employment 
following a 10 per cent  increase  in the mlnlmum 
wage.  Gramllch's  conclusions on this point, 
however,  depend crucially upon the plausibility of 
his model, upon the many assumptions he had to 
make  regarding  parameter  values,  and  upon  the 
generally poor quality of the data. Sharply different 
estimates  of  the  disemployment  elasticities  and 
welfare  loss  might  have  been  obtained  using 
different,  equally  plausible,  assumptions.  See 
Robert  J.  Flanagan  and  Michael  L.  Wachter, 
"Comments and  Discussion,"  BPEA,  2:1976,  pp. 
452-61. 
employment due to the minimum  wage, 
though  this  is  hypothesized  to  affect 
mainly 20-25 year olds and those over 65. 
Results  for adult  females,  on  the  other 
hand,  show  no  such  response.  On  the 
contrary,  Gramlich  concludes,  a reason- 
able explanation of  what  is happening is 
that  the  higher  minimum  wage  mainly 
benefits adult  females who are  attracted 
from the part-time into the full-time labor 
force,  forcing  low-wage  teenagers  into 
part-time employment. 
The Minimum Wage,  Inflation, 
.and the Distribution of Income 
In  his study,  Gramlich  also  examined 
the  impact  of  the  minimum  wage  on 
inflation and  the distribution of  income. 
An increase in the minimum  wage tends 
to raise the rate of  inflation in two ways. 
First,  because  wages  in  the  covered 
sector  rise  relative  to  the  uncovered 
sector, minimum wage increases encour- 
age  unemployed  workers  to  refuse 
uncovered employment  while waiting  for 
a job in the covered  sector.  As  a result, 
the  unemployment  rate  rises  and  the 
trade-off between unemployment  and 
inflation tends  to  worsen?'  Second,  the 
higher minimum wage tends to raise the 
total  wage  bill  in  the  economy,  both 
directly-  because  covered  low-wage 
workers get  higher  wages-and  indi- 
rectly-because other wages tend to rise 
when  the  minimum  increases.  For 
example, the 25  per cent increase in the 
17 Gramlich,  pp.  442-43.  Whether  the  disemploy- 
ment  effects  estimated  In  earlier  studies  are 
"slight" Is, of  course,  a matter of  opinion.  Even 
Gramlich's' small  0.09 estimated elasticity  means 
that  the  25  per  cent  minimum  wage  increase  in 
1974 lowered teenage employment  by 2.3 per cent 
and  raised  the  teenage  unemployment  rate  by  2 
percentage  points  (Gramlich,  footnote  30).  Note, 
also,  that Gramllch's  elasticity  estimate  for 
full-time teenageemployment is 0.50,  almost  six 
times as large. 
18 Wachter, p. 459. 
14  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Econo  lmic Review  January 1978 minimum to $2 in 1974 directly raised the 
wage  bill  by  about  0.4  per  cent, .and 
indirectly raised it another 0.4  per cent.lB 
Such an  increase in labor costs tends to 
be passed on by employers in the form of 
higher prices. 
Gramlich's findings also reveal that the 
relationship  between  low-wage  workers 
and low family income is very  weak,  and 
therefore,  that  the  minimum  wage  has 
little positive effect  upon  the  redistribu- 
tion of income toward low-wage families. 
The results for teenagers were especially 
dramatic.  Among  families  that  contain 
teenagers  who  receive  low  wages,  the 
median  family  income  was  $12,900, 
substantially higher  than the median 
income of  families containing high-wage 
teenagers.  Furthermore, fully 40  per cent 
of  low-wage teenagers were members of 
families whose reported income exceeded 
$15,000.  From  these  and  other  data, 
Gramlich concludes, "The generally loose 
correlation  between  wages  and  family 
incomes implies that minimum wages will 
never have strong redistributive effects."*O 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis  of  the  impact  of  minimum 
wage  legislation on the labor market has 
been an extremely popular subject in the 
economic  literature  in recent  years.  The 
effect  on  youth  unemployment  has 
received  particular  attention  for  several 
reasons.  First,  young  people  are  much 
more  likely  than  adults  to work  in  low- 
wage  employment.  Second,  the  youth 
unemployment  rate,  especially  that  for 
19 Gramlich, pp. 426-30. 
20 Gramlich,  pp.  443-49.  Low-wage  workers  were 
those who, in 1973,  usually  received less than  $2 
per hour. High-wage workers usually  recelved more 
than $4 per hour. 
minority teenagers, has risen dramatically 
in recent  years.  Third,  this  tremendous 
unemployment increase has occurred just 
as  a new  minimum  wage  bill  has  been 
passed by Congress.  - 
Among  economists,  the  issue  is  not 
whether the minimum wage  has good or 
bad  effects.  Economic  theory and 
virtually  all  studies  of  the  issue  are  in 
agreement  that,  at  best,  the  minimum 
wage  is  a  highly  inefficient  tool  for 
redistributing income. At worst, it is also 
a major cause  of  economic  dislocation, 
distortion,  and  unemployment.  The 
question that the literature has generally 
addressed, then,  is just  how  serious are 
the various effects on the economy. For a 
variety of reasons, however, this question 
has proven extremely difficult to answer. 
A  major  factor  in  this  difficulty  is 
certainly the poor quality ofthe  available 
data. Many of the major series needed for 
a thorough analysis simply do  not  exist. 
Other series are too recent to be useful in 
time-series analysis, while still other data 
are of such dubious quality that their use 
leads to very  tenuous results.  A  second 
factor is the complexity of the real world, 
always  a  problem  in  research  of  this 
nature.  Finally,  even  without  these 
difficulties,  there  would probably remain 
among  the  model  builders  substantial 
disagreement as to the exact form of  the 
"correct" model, and the proper variables 
to include. 
Despite these complications,  the great 
weight of evidence is on the side of those 
who  stress  the  negative  aspects  of  the 
minimum wage.  Two recent  studies,  one 
by  James  F.  Ragan,  Jr.,  and  one  by 
Edward M.  Gramlich,  provide further 
support  to  this  negative  view.  Using 
previously  unexploited  data  and  a  new 
model specification,  Ragan finds that the 
minimum  wage  has  had  a  major 
disemployment  effect  on  teenagers, 
especially on black youth. In addition, the participation rate of minority teenagers is 
reduced  by  the  minimum  wage,  further 
worsening their economic predicament. 
In a very  complicated article,  Gramlich 
examines a number  of  important  issues 
involving  not  only  teenagers,  but  adult 
males  and  adult  females  as  well. 
Gramlich,  too,  finds  a  disemployment 
effect  for  teenagers,  though  of  smaller 
magnitude  than  Ragan.  He  also  finds 
such an effect for adult males, but not for 
females.  Using  these results  and  some 
guidelines  derived  from  a  series  of 
complex  theoretical  models,  Gramlich 
concludes  that  the  low-wage sectors  of 
these three groups may not be worse off, 
taken  as  a  whole,  because  the 
disemployment  effects  do  not  outweigh 
the  greater  income  received  by  those 
continuing to be employed at the higher 
minimum. However, because of the many 
assumptions  involved  in  Gramlich's 
methodology, other economists have 
questioned the validity.of this conclusion. 
Other  results,  however,  are  striking. 
Gramlich finds, for example, that despite 
what  he  characterizes  as  "slight 
displacement" for teenagers as a  whole, 
large  numbers  of  previously  full-time 
teenage  workers  have  been  pushed  into 
involuntary part-time employment by  the 
minimum wage.  The income and training 
losses  due  to  this  displacement  are 
probably quite severe.  Gramlich also 
calculates a significant  inflationary effect 
of the minimum wage, principally through 
its impact on the total wage bill. Finally, 
Gramlich shows clearly  that  the goal  of 
redistributing  income  through  the 
minimum  wage,  or  lifting  low-income 
families  out  of  poverty  by  raising  the 
minimum,  is  illusory.  Especially  for 
teenagers,  but  for  adults  as  well,  the 
relationship  between  low  individual 
wages and low .family income is so slight 
that the minimum wage is very unlikely to 
have the hypothesized strong redistribu- 
tive effects. 
16  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Economic Review  January 1978 